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I .  OVERVIEW
Support for the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS) in Indonesia raises the risk of vio-
lence there even though the capacity of violent extremist groups remains low. This could change 
with the eventual return home of Indonesians now fighting in Syria and Iraq who will have 
the training, combat experience, and leadership potential now lacking in Indonesia’s extremist 
community.
The 22 September 2014 exhortation by IS spokesman Al-Adnani to kill foreigners linked to 
the U.S.-led coalition could also provide an incentive to Indonesian ISIS supporters to target 
Westerners as a way of earning approval from leaders of the self-declared caliphate. The Indone-
sian translation of that exhortation includes this passage: 
If you do not have bombs or bullets, and a kafir (infidel) from America or France or one of 
their allies comes out, hit him in the head with a rock, carve him up with a knife, hit him 
with your car, throw him off a high building or poison him!1 
Would-be terrorists in Indonesia for the last four years have focused exclusively on domestic 
targets, mostly the police, and they continued to do so even after the caliphate was announced. 
The instruction from Al-Adnani, however, could be taken seriously by those who have both 
pledged allegiance to IS and have already used or attempted to use violence.
This report examines the ISIS support network in Indonesia, how it emerged, who joined 
it and how it has evolved. It also looks at the Indonesian government’s response. While that 
response has been forceful, the government still needs to translate decrees into action. It has 
instructed prison officials to step up monitoring of convicted terrorists, for example, yet Al-Ad-
nani’s grim message was translated by one of those prisoners and posted on radical websites 
within 24 hours of its issuance.
President Yudhoyono’s government announced a ban on ISIS on 4 August after the appear-
ance on YouTube of a video called “Joining the Ranks”, in which an Indonesian calling himself 
“Abu Muhammad al Indunisi” urges others to follow his example and join the jihad in Syria.  
Abu Muhammad turned out to be an activist named Bahrum Syah with links to an extremist 
organisation once known as Al Muhajiroun. Al Muhajiroun’s founders, Omar Bakri Muham-
mad and Anjem Choudary, have gone on to establish a global network of advocacy groups sup-
porting the establishment of Islamic law, if necessary by violent means. The first branch, in the 
UK where Choudary is based, was called Islam4UK, later Sharia4UK. Each national branch had 
“Sharia4” in its title; Sharia4Indonesia was established in 2010. 
A small group of Indonesians inspired by Bakri and Choudary became the engine of the 
pro-ISIS network in Indonesia. The group runs the website www.al-mustaqbal.net, hereafter 
referred to as Al-Mustaqbal. It has links to most of the terrorist groups still operating in Indone-
sia, including the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT) and the 
Mujahidin of Western Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesian Barat, MIB). It sponsored most of the 
ceremonies across Indonesia pledging loyalty to IS after the latter on 29 June 2014 announced 
the establishment of a caliphate. And its fighters in Syria, including Bahrum Syah, have formed 
an Indonesian-Malaysian unit of ISIS in Syria that reportedly aims at eventually establishing an 
archipelagic Islamic State in Southeast Asia, to be called Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara.
The report also examines how the announcement of the caliphate has split the Indonesian 
jihadi community, leading to deep divisions among convicted terrorist prisoners and the splin-
tering of a leading jihadi organisation, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT). The individual who has 
emerged as the most important ideological promoter of ISIS is Aman Abdurrahman, a cleric 
1 “Statement Resmi Syeikh Al-Adnaniy : Sesungguhnya Rabb-mu Benar-Benar Mengintai”, Al-Mustaqbal.net, 23 September 
2014.
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imprisoned in the maximum security complex on the island of Nusakambangan, off the south 
coast of Java. It is he who became the mentor of the Sharia4Indonesia group and whose followers 
constitute the glue that binds disparate elements of the Indonesian ISIS network together. 
The appearance of ISIS may be a rare example of international developments becoming a 
direct driver of jihadi recruitment in Indonesia. In the past, the drivers have been overwhelm-
ingly local. When Indonesians went to Afghanistan to train in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, 
they were spurred by repression at home and the desire to develop the capacity to fight Soeharto. 
The bombing campaign of Jemaah Islamiyah between 1999 and 2002 was sparked by communal 
conflict at home, in Ambon and Poso. Despite all the rhetoric about support for Palestine, very 
few Indonesians have ever gone to fight there. The appeal of ISIS is different, a combination of 
religious prophecies involving Sham (greater Syria); the string of victories in Iraq in June that 
gave a sense of backing a winner; the resonance of the concept of the caliphate; and sophisticated 
use by ISIS of social media.
At the same time, ISIS has triggered a bigger backlash than ever seen before in the Indonesian 
Muslim community, suggesting that support will stay limited to a fringe of the radical fringe. 
The individuals involved are nonetheless dangerous, and it is cause for concern that inmates of 
high security prisons continue to be among the most active propagators of ISIS views and teach-
ings. Indonesian prison management has improved in recent years, but there is a long way to go. 
The incoming Jokowi government will have to decide whether to continue the counter-ter-
rorism policies of the Yudhoyono government or ramp them up, including by pressing for 
strengthened legal tools. Either way, it is critical that leadership of the counter-terrorism effort 
be left in the hands of the police, who over the last decade have accumulated all the institutional 
knowledge of radical networks. 
II .  THE ORIGINS OF AL-MUHAJIRUN IN INDONESIA
Support for ISIS in Indonesia goes back to the links of one young Indonesian activist, Tuah 
Febriwansyah alias Muhammad Fachry, to the organisation Al-Muhajiroun. Founded by a mili-
tant Syrian cleric named Omar Bakri Muhammad, Al-Muhajiroun started out in 1983 as a salafi 
jihadi wing of the organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) the radical international organisation cam-
paigning for a caliphate and the application of Islamic law. In 1986, Omar Bakri was expelled 
from Saudi Arabia for creating a clandestine network of HT cells. He moved to the UK where 
he became simultaneously head of Al-Muhajiroun and leader of the British branch of HT. He 
broke completely with the latter in 1996 and together with a cleric named Anjem Choudary set 
up Al-Muhajiroun as a separate organisation. While it was officially disbanded in 2004, it has 
lived on under different names. Omar Bakri was expelled from Britain in 2005 and moved to 
Lebanon, where he was arrested in May 2014. Anjem Choudary stayed in Britain.
If Hizb ut-Tahrir focused on creating a mass base to support the restoration of the caliphate, 
Al-Muhajiroun (and its later incarnations) see jihad as a critical means of getting there. It thus 
supports violence in a way that its parent organisation never did.  Its proponents see the formal 
application of Islamic law as the primary duty of every Muslim; anyone who thinks otherwise is 
considered a non-believer (kafir). Indeed, anyone who does not share its very particular under-
standing of how the law should be applied is considered idolatrous. As a result, many Muslims 
in the salafi and salafi jihadi communities see Al-Muhajiroun as takfiri, or too quick to brand 
others as kafir.
Although it was a jihadi organisation, Al-Muhajiroun from the outset differed from Al-Qaeda 
in that it stressed the need to carve out a territory in which Islam could be applied. It was not 
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just about attacking the enemy.2 This was later to make it the perfect vehicle for promoting ISIS 
and the Islamic state.
Al-Muhajiroun came to Indonesia through the Internet. In 2005, Muhammad Fachry, usual-
ly seen as just M. Fachry, found Al-Muhajiroun through a video chat forum called Paltalk (www.
paltalk.com) and began to take part in online religious discussions led by Omar Bakri.3 Bakri 
reportedly gave him the green light to set up an Al-Muhajirun group in Indonesia—he dropped 
the “o” in the spelling—as the organisation considered Indonesia a key country. In one of its 
documents it states:
Al-Muhajiroun believes that countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Indo-
nesia and Malaysia must be our targets to establish the caliphate. These countries do not 
only contain three-quarters of the world’s Muslims but they also have armies stronger than 
the Middle East which have not been infiltrated by foreign forces (unlike the militaries of 
the Middle East), and the Muslims there have a strong desire [to uphold] Islam.4
Fachry built up two mailing lists that he called “Al Ghuraba” and “Ahlus Sunnah Waljamaah”, 
for sending out Al-Muhajiroun material.5 In 2006 he began using the free Geocities web hosting 
service to promote the organisation, using the site www.geocities.com/abuya_2005/almuhaji-
run. He then bought the domain www.almuahjirun.com, which exists to this day. Fachry and 
his wife, Ummu Fauzi, translated Bakri’s writings from English and uploaded them on the site. 
Around the same time, Fachry began taking part in an online religious discussion run by a 
jihadi who used the nickname Qital (the Arabic word for “battle”), to which another person, 
using the name Al Irhab, or “terror”, was a frequent contributor. Qital turned out to be Abdul 
Aziz, a junior high school teacher from Pekalongan, arrested in 2005 for assisting the terrorist 
mastermind Noordin Top set up a website called www.anshar.net, long since shut down by the 
Indonesian government. Al Irhab was the Bali bomber then on death row and since executed, 
Imam Samudra. From others in the discussion group, Fachry obtained translations from Arabic 
into Indonesian of writings by two other radical clerics, Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz, better 
known in the West as Dr. Fadl, and Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, and uploaded these as well.
With the knowledge he gleaned from these discussions, Fachry in 2006 set up his own study 
circle via Yahoo messenger and MSN messenger, and invited those on his lists to take part in 
Omar Bakri’s lectures via Paltalk. He also began moving beyond cyberspace to promote Bakri’s 
teachings in person through lectures and sermons.
A. Fachry Starts a Magazine
In addition to his online activities, Fachry wanted to start a magazine, because like many other 
jihadis, he believed that Islam’s enemies, especially America and its allies, controlled the main-
stream global media and therefore it was important to develop the tools to fight back in the 
2 In ideological terms, this was the difference between qital tamkin, the more strategic use of jihadi in service of long-term 
strategic goals as promoted by Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi as opposed to qital nikayah, the tactic of weakening the enemy 
through repeated attacks, associated with Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, leader of the Al-Qaeda-linked insurgency in Iraq who 
was killed in 2006.
3 Omar Bakri was banned from Britain the same year. He had publicly supported the London underground bombers for 
their 7 July 2005 attack and left for Lebanon a month later, where he was subsequently detained with Anjem Choudary. 
Choudary was eventually deported back to Britain, but Bakri stayed in Lebanon. On 25 May 2014 he was arrested by the 
Lebanese authorities and later charged with masterminding a terrorist cell in northern Lebanon.
4 See linkwebislam.blogspot.com.au/2013/01/al-muhajirunnet.html.
5 These were both alternative names for Al-Muhajiroun. Anjem Choudary launched Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah in late 2005, 
while Bakri was still in a Beirut prison, and set up al Guraba in 2006.
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information war.6 In 2007, the first edition of the magazine Al-Muhajirun was published, with 
the lead article entitled “Staying on the Road to Jihad”. It included translations of works by rad-
ical ulama and an interview with Osama bin Laden. The second edition, in mid-2007, featured 
a profile of the Islamic State in Iraq, the precursor of ISIS. In it, the authors explained how the 
establishment of a caliphate would take place via the building of smaller Islamic polities (imarah 
Islam) that would eventually be joined together.
The magazine’s appearance drew Fachry into wider interaction with the jihadi community. 
He became close to Muhammad Jibriel, the owner and editor of www.arrahmah.com, which by 
2007 was the biggest jihadi website in Indonesia.7 Jibriel asked Fachry to join, and he agreed, 
seeing Jibriel’s site as a way of reaching more potential followers of Al-Muhajiroun’s teachings.8 
Both had a vision of expanding the website into a publishing empire that would include divi-
sions for books, magazines and DVDs.
The Arrahmah Media Network came into being in 2008, with the publishing division releas-
ing the writings of the three Bali bombers in January 2009, just months after they were executed. 
They also published a book by Al-Maqdisi, translated by Aman Abdurrahman, with the title “Is 
Democracy Compatible with Islam?” They also released jihadi videos, downloaded from the 
Internet, and published a short-lived glossy magazine called Jihadmagz.
Fachry, meanwhile, kept the Al Muhajirun magazine going, with a lead article as Indonesia’s 
2009 legislative and presidential elections approached, entitled, “Don’t Vote, Stay Muslim”. The 
slogan had been adopted by Omar Bakri during British elections in June 2004; it subsequently 
was used more globally to drive home the point that elections symbolised governments under-
pinned by man-made rather than God-given law.
In addition to his work at Arrahmah, Fachry began attending regular discussions on jihad 
that were held at the Al-Munawaroh Mosque in Pamulang, Bekasi outside Jakarta, led by Mu-
hammed Jibriel’s father, Abu Jibril. By early 2009 another preacher began leading discussions 
there regularly – Aman Abdurrahman, who had just been released from prison in mid-2008. 
Fachry had long followed Aman’s writings and translations and believed that his religious precepts, 
and his commitment to jihad in the service of applying Islamic law and building an Islamic state, were 
exactly the same as Al-Muhajiroun’s. At these discussions, Fachry became close friends with a 
man named Bahrum Syah, who was the coordinator for Aman’s religious lectures and teachings 
in the Pamulang area.
In August 2009, one month after the bombings of the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Ja-
karta, the study sessions at Al-Munawaroh were disrupted, when another local cleric threatened 
to attack the mosque, accusing it of teaching terrorism.9 One of the hotel bombers, a teenager 
named Dani Dwi Permana, had been recruited in a mosque not far from Pamulang and this 
6 IPAC interview with former member of radical discussion group, Jakarta, August 2014. Fachry was very influenced in his 
thinking on these matters by the book “Practical Guide to Becoming a Mujahid” (Idhoat Ala Darbil Jihad) by Yusuf bin 
Sholih Al-‘Uyairy Al-Battar, an Al-Qaeda ideologue. Al-‘Uyairy wrote that jihad could be waged not just on the battlefield 
with AK47s and RPGs but also via the media. This included disseminating material in any form that could encourage jihad. 
“For those who lack the capacity to write tracts themselves, they can distribute material by hand, fax or email. Jihad can be 
writing articles in magazines, bulletins, newspapers, on the Internet, sending emails to thousands, defending Islam at every 
opportunity.” See Petunjuk Praktis Menjadi Mujahid (translation by Syahida Man of Idhoat Ala Darbil Jihad,  no pagination 
or date).
7 Arrahmah has substantially declined in popularity in the last year but only because of factors related to Indonesia’s 2014 
presidential election. It was the leading jihadi website in 2013, but was overtaken in 2014 by voa-islam.com because of the 
latter’s anti-Jokowi coverage. According to the site Alexa.com that ranks websites based on hits and homepage views, in 
2014 voa-islam.com ranked 267 among Indonesian sites; eramuslim.com 462; arrahmah.com 498; shoutussalam.com, 818; 
al-mustaqbal.net 1,367 and muslimdaily.net, 5,260. See www.alexa.com
8 IPAC interview with former member of radical discussion group, Jakarta, August 2014.
9 This was Abdullah Assegaf, a moderate cleric who had long been angry with the activists at Al-Munawaroh mosque for 
denigrating their traditional Muslim practices as idolatrous. These included celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, Maulid, 
and recitation of the tahlilan prayers following a death.
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raised fears that terrorist groups would find other potential “bridegrooms”, as suicide bombers 
were called, from other mosques in the area. Then, on 25 August 2009, Muhammad Jibriel was 
arrested for meeting and trying to help the mastermind of the hotel bombings, Noordin Top, 
who had once been his teacher. Jibriel’s arrest hit the Arrahmah enterprise hard, with donors 
deserting it and Fachry forced to do much of the work on his own. Jibriel was sentenced to five 
years in prison in late June 2010.
B. Sharia4Indonesia
By 2010 Fachry, in addition to his work on Arrahmah, started another initiative, inspired by the 
Al-Muhajiroun founders. He began a grassroots campaign called Sharia4Indonesia, modelled 
on Islam4UK or Sharia4UK that Anjem Choudary started in November 2008.10 This was a proj-
ect to set up territorial zones applying Islamic law, the so-called imarah Islam that Bakri and 
Choudary saw as the building blocks of a caliphate. Fachry’s friend, a man named Abu Shofiy, 
became Sharia4Indonesia’s head.
Fachry and his friends also planned to bring Omar Bakri to Indonesia in March 2010 to help 
launch the Indonesian translation of Bakri’s book, The Islamic Standard. The Lebanese govern-
ment refused to give him a visa, however, and Fachry invited Anjem Choudary instead. The visit 
took place in March 2010, and Choudary made an appearance promoting Sharia4Indonesia 
at the 9th Islamic Book Fair in Senayan, Jakarta. The new organisation was formally launched 
with a demonstration at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in Jakarta in August 2010, around the 
same time as similar efforts around the globe: Sharia4France, Sharia4Belgium, Sharia4Holland, 
Sharia4Pakistan, Sharia4Hind, and so on. About two dozen people showed up, not enough to be 
taken seriously. The Jakarta campaign was followed by Sharia4Jatim in East Java, Sharia4Band-
ung and in North Sumatra, Sharia4Tanjung Balai. The objective of the project was to establish a 
“sharia zone” in Indonesia that would be free from gambling, alcoholic drinks, prostitution and 
other vices. It aimed to get community support by allying with organisations such as Islamic 
Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), since its own numbers were far too small to attract 
much attention. 
In September 2010, its members took an active role to campaign for the release of Mur-
hali Barda, an FPI leader whom police had arrested for inciting violence during a protest he 
had helped organise against a Batak Protestant church in Ciketing, Bekasi. Two months later, 
in November 2010, they joined another hardline organisation, the Islamic Reform Movement 
(Gerakan Reformis Islam, GARIS) and several other groups to demand the closing of a church 
in Karasak, Bandung.
They also tried to win public support by organising social activities and emergency health 
care in disaster areas, including in central Java after the eruption of the Merapi volcano in Octo-
ber 2010. They tried to exploit the situation by campaigning on the theme of “Indonesia Atones”, 
saying that the rash of disasters to strike Indonesia, from the 2004 tsunami to earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions, had happened because both the Muslim community and the government of 
Indonesia had failed to apply Islamic law.11
III .  CONFLICT OVER THE CALIPHATE AND KAFIRS
As the Arab Spring upheavals rocked the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, M. Fachry and 
his friends saw the fall of dictators as the first step toward the establishment of the caliphate. 
10  In January 2010, Choudary’s new initiative was banned under the UK’s Terrorism Act.
11  See sharia4jatim.wordpress.com/2010/10/30/indonesia-bertobat.
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They cited a hadith that foretold the political cycle of the Islamic community.12 It began with 
the rule of the Prophet himself, followed by the caliphate of his followers (khilafah alaa minha-
jin nubuwwah), then by inherited kingdoms that followed Islamic law, then by brutal dictators 
and finally by a return to the caliphate.13 Fachry believed the reference to inherited kingdoms 
denoted the period that ended with the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. The Arab Spring 
upheavals were a sign that the subsequent period of authoritarian rule was ending and the caliph-
ate was in sight.
The tiny Sharia4Indonesia group campaigned for Islamic law with more enthusiasm than 
ever, but later in 2011, the jihadi community split over the doctrinal issue of whether security 
forces of an idolatrous state (ansharut thaghut) could be condemned as kafir institutionally, or 
whether they should be judged as individuals. According to a 1993 tract by Abdul Qadir bin Ab-
dul Aziz (Dr. Fadl) that reached Indonesia in translation in 2004, the generation of the Prophet’s 
companions had agreed on the first, meaning that all should be considered non-believers (takfir 
mu’ayyan). Not only did this mean that subsequent generations were bound by this interpreta-
tion, but also that anyone who took a different view was also a kafir whose property could be 
seized or his blood shed.14 Fachry’s mentors, Omar Bakri and Anjem Choudary, subscribed to 
this position; its primary proponent in Indonesia was Aman Abdurrahman.
In Indonesia, jihadi support for takfir mu’ayyan underwent a revision in 2011 with the ap-
pearance of a book by an Al-Qaeda leader, Abu Yahya Al-Libi.15 Abu Yahya criticised the way 
Abdul Qadir had used one case in the past to extrapolate to the present and wrote that it was not 
necessarily the case that every individual in the service of an idolatrous ruler was a kafir. It might 
be that someone joined out of ignorance or misinterpretation of the Qur’an; that person should 
not be condemned out of hand. This argument made sense to one faction of jihadis, led by im-
prisoned Jemaah Islamiyah leaders Abu Dujana and Zarkasih alias Mbah, that became known as 
the takfir am group.16 They influenced many of their fellow inmates in Jakarta’s Cipinang Prison 
—including Muhammad Jibriel of Arrahmah.  
Fachry found Jibriel’s association with the takfir am group unacceptable, and in March 2012, 
he decided to leave Arrahmah. The differences became public in May 2012 when Arrahmah 
published a piece called “The Phenomenon of the Debate Over Branding Thaghut Security Forc-
es as Kafir, Quo Vadis?” It aimed to lay out both sides of the debate, but it drew a sharp response 
from Aman Abdurrahman from his prison cell, who wrote, “This writing aims to reinforce the 
Muslim-ness of idolators and their partisans [...] without any valid proof.”17
Arrahmah shot back with a piece castigating Aman for branding civil servants as kafir be-
cause they took an oath of loyalty to the Indonesian republic. This was hypocritical, they sug-
gested, because Aman himself still had an Indonesian identity card that was proof of citizenship, 
so maybe it was he who was the kafir.
Look at the rebels in Aceh. They did not recognise the unitary republic of Indonesia and 
12 A hadith is a saying or deed attributed to the Prophet and is an important source of Islamic law.
13 M Fachry, “Revolusi Tunisia, Jihad Global & Saatnya Khilafah Memimpin Dunia”, Arrahmah.com, 30 January 2011.
14 Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz, “Status Aparat Ansharut Thogut, Dari Kalangan Tentara, Polisi, Inteligen dan Ulama Su’u”, 
translation of chapter 10 of the original Arabic book, Al Jami fi thalabil Ilmi Asy-Syarif, Aman Abdurrahman, translator, 
2004.
15 The book’s Arabic title was Nazharat fi al-Ijma’ Al-Qath’l.
16 The intellectual leaders of this group were Parmin alias Aslam and Lutfi Hudaeroh alias Ubeid. Parmin was a JI translator 
arrested in 2008 for working with Noordin Top on the book Sowing Jihad, Reaping Terror (Menabur Jihad Menuai Teror) 
who has become one of the JI intellectuals and strong anti-ISIS advocates in Cipinang prison. Lutfi Hudaeroh alias Ubeid, 
was a former JI member who became a close associate of Noordin Top and a leader of the terrorist training camp estab-
lished in Aceh in 2010. He worked with Parmin on the above-mentioned book.
17 See the debate at “Fenomena perdebatan seputar takfir ta’yin terhadap anshar thaghut, quo vadis?”, Arrahmah.com, 10 May 
2012 and “Tanggapan ustadz Aman Abdurrahman hafizhahullah atas artikel ‘Fenomena perdebatan seputar takfir ta’yin 
terhadap anshar thaghut, quo vadis?’”, Arrahmah.com, 14 May 2012. 
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refused to hold Indonesian identity cards. Their understanding of religion was not as cor-
rect as Ustad Aman’s, but why is that they took such a [principled] position whereas Ustad 
Aman does not?18
As the debate grew hotter, each side declared members of the rival side kafir. In Kembang 
Kuning prison in the maximum security penal complex on Nusakambangan island, Aman Ab-
durrahman and Iman Dharmawan alias Rois declared three jihadi inmates belonging to the 
takfir am group kafir because they refused to brand all prison guards as unbelievers.19
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF FAKSI
After Fachry parted company with Arrahmah, he set up a new jihadi website called Al-Mus-
taqbal (www.al-mustaqbal.net). The new site was used to reinforce the Sharia4Indonesia cam-
paign as well as to promote the views of the takfir mu’ayyan group, led by Aman Abdurrahman.
Meanwhile, the doctrinal conflict also reached the discussion group at the Al-Munawaroh 
mosque in Pamulang, where Abu Jibril sided with his son and the takfir am group. As a result, 
Aman Abdurrahman’s followers left the mosque and set up their own discussion group at the 
Al-Islam mosque in Babakan, Serpong, in Banten, just outside Jakarta. Three of the key figures 
in the new group were Fachry, Abu Shofiy and Bahrum Syah.
Bahrum Syah had been a communications student at the State Islamic University (Univer-
sitas Islam Negeri, UIN) in Ciputat in southern Jakarta but left before he graduated and trans-
ferred to Pamulang University, where he became an activist with a religious propagation organ-
isation, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK. He joined Abu Jibril’s discussion group because the 
Al-Munawaroh mosque was not far from his house and became a particularly devoted follower 
of Aman Abdurrahman, arranging his lectures and appearances in the Pamulang area. Through 
these meetings, he came to know members of other jihadi groups, including former members of 
the Darul Islam faction led until his July 2011 arrest by Abdullah Umar. These included a man 
named Kodrat.20
In July 2012, Kodrat invited Bahrum Syah to attend a meeting in Situgintung that resulted in 
Kodrat’s selection as the amir of a new group. The members included most of Abdullah Umar’s 
old network, together with members of JAT from West Java and some others. Bahrum joined, 
but within a few months, the group had split with one faction breaking away to establish the 
Mujahidin of Western Indonesia and the rest, including Bahrum, staying with Kodrat.
Bahrum Syah himself was not a very active member. He was more focused on a publishing 
company he had set up called P-TA, short for Penegak Tauhid Press, which among other things 
published Aman Abdurrahman’s writings and translations. He also continued to be active co-
ordinating lectures on the oneness of God (tauhid) in the Pamulang area and running the dis-
cussion group at the Al-Islam mosque. Three men were regular lecturers there: the extremist 
preacher Halawi Makmun on religious issues, Fachry on developments in the Muslim world, 
especially in the Middle East, and Abu Shofiy on the progress of establishing the caliphate.21
As with many other jihadis, Fachry and Bahrum Syah believed that the conflict in Syria was 
18 “Diskusi Seputar Takfir Mu’ayyan dengan Ustadz Aman Abdurrahman”, at anshoruttauhidwassunnahwaljihad.blogspot.
com, 18 May 2012.
19 The three declared kafir were Toni Togar, Achmad Hasan and Subur Sugiarto, Toni Togar is a former JI member, arrested 
for a bank robbery in Medan 2003 and for involvement in organising the August 2010 robbery of the CIMB-Niaga bank in 
Medan from his prison cell. Achmad Hasan was sentenced to death for his role in the 2004 Australian embassy bombing. 
Subur Sugiyarto was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in the 2005 Bali bombing.
20 For background on the Abdullah Umar network, see IPAC Report No. 5, Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western 
Indonesia, 2 December 2013.
21 IPAC interview with former member of radical discussion group, Jakarta, August 2014.
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the fulfilment of a prediction in some Islamic texts that the battle for the end of the world be-
tween the Imam Mahdi, the Islamic messiah, and the Dajjal, the Islamic equivalent of the An-
tichrist, would begin there, that Islam would emerge victorious and that a new caliphate would 
be established.22 They became even more convinced of this in late 2012 and decided that they 
needed to step up efforts to prepare the ground for an imarah Islam in Indonesia, so when the 
caliphate was announced, Indonesia could join.
A. The Major Players
In early 2013, therefore Fachry and his friends set up the Forum of Islamic Law Activists (Forum 
Aktivis Syariat Islam, FAKSI), with Fachry as head and Bahrum in the dual role of deputy head 
and secretary-general. Members came from Sharia4Indonesia as well as Aman Abdurrahman’s 
followers. Among those who joined were Siswanto, from Lamongan, a brother-in-law of the 
then imprisoned jihadi Sibghotullah; Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah from Bima, once a JAT activ-
ist; and Salim Mubarok from Malang. 23 It is instructive to look at their backgrounds.
• Siswanto attended the Al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s school and 
then taught at the Al-Islam pesantren in Lamongan. Al-Islam was once a radical school 
under the aegis of Bali bombers Muchlas and Amrozi but has become a force for moder-
ation under the influence of their brother, Ali Imron, still in prison but active in count-
er-radicalisation activities, and their half-brother, Ali Fauzi. In 2007, Siswanto left the 
school because he believed it had abandoned jihad, and joined the Lamongan branch of 
the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). He became attracted to the teachings and writings of 
Aman Abdurrahman, and after Aman was released from prison in 2008, became one of 
his most devoted followers. FPI-Lamongan became radical as a result, to the point of con-
demning their own national leader, Habib Rizieq, as an idolator.  FPI headquarters then 
ended its relations with the branch. In 2012, when the debate between takfir mu’ayyan and 
takfir am factions was at its height, Siswanto was at the forefront of the former.24
• Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah from Bima was the son of Natsir Kecil (“Little Natsir”), a 
man from Dompu, Bima who had joined Abu Bakar Ba’asyir when he first fled to Malaysia 
in 1985. Iskandar had his first education in the JI school Lukmanul Hakiem, then moved 
briefly to Gontor, the well-known Islamic school in East Java, before finally graduating 
from a pesantren in Sukabumi. He then became a student in the Arabic language divi-
sion of the State Islamic University, living in Tanah Abang with his parents. Beginning 
in 2002, he began attending Aman Abdurrahman’s lectures in the At-Taqwa mosque in 
Tanah Abang, stopping only after Aman was arrested in March 2004 for involvement in a 
bomb-making class in Cimanggis, outside Jakarta. In 2004, Iskandar returned to the home 
of his father’s family in Bima and began propagating Aman Abdurrahman’s ideas, partic-
ularly in the Istiqomah Mosque in Bima. While Aman was still in prison, in early 2008, 
Iskandar was arranging for him to give lectures by speaker phone. After he was released, 
Iskandar invited Aman to Bima. He accepted, and in February 2009, he came to Bima 
for almost a month and gave lectures at several mosques including Istiqomah. He also 
22 See IPAC Report No. 6, Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict, 30 January 2014. 
23 This Siswanto is not the same as the Siswanto arrested in December 2013. See www.shoutussalam.com/2013/12/siswan-
to-aktivis-masjid-diculik-densus-88-selepas-shalat-isya-berjamaah.
24 Siswanto took part in one debate where he took on a group of alumni of the JI school Darusyahada, all of whom defended 
takfir am. The debate ended with his branding as kafir a leading Lamongan scholar who supported takfir am. This was 
Azhari Dipo Kusuma, head of the JI school Al-Ikhlas in Lamongan. Dipo himself had traveled to Syria with the humani-
tarian organization Hilal Ahmar Society Indoneia (HASI). He made a point of trying to understand the conflict between 
Al-Nusra and ISIS and decided to support Al-Nusra.
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lectured at the Umar bin Khattab pesantren that in 2008 had allied itself with Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir’s new organisation, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid or JAT. The takfiri stance of Aman 
and Iskandar troubled the Bima Islamist community, especially JAT members, and even-
tually divided it, with the more militant leaving JAT because they were no longer welcome. 
Iskandar urged his followers to take part in military preparation (i’dad) and sent some to 
Poso to train with Santoso. A few ended up joining Santoso’s organisation, Mujahidin of 
Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT).
• Salim Mubarok at-Tamimi was from Pasuruan, of Yemeni Arab descent, who had been 
a student of the salafi leader Jafar Umar Thalib. When the Maluku conflict had erupted 
in 1999, he joined Laskar Jihad. He then studied in Dammaj, Yemen, at the well-known 
school, Darul Hadits, where he became a student of the salafi scholars, Muqbil bin Hadi 
al Wadi and Yahua bin Ali Hajuri. He returned to Malang to teach salafi doctrine. Initially 
he was very opposed to the teachings of Aman Abdurrahman, whom he characterised as a 
khawarij (deviant). But he was challenged to a debate in 2010 by Aman, who by then had 
been rearrested for his role in the Aceh training camp. Salim readily admitted that he lost 
to Aman in terms of references cited and became Aman’s disciple from that moment. In 
Malang, he propagated Aman’s teachings together with Mashudi, a JAT activist there who 
had been a teacher at Al-Islam in Lamongan and who like himself had studied in Yemen. 
The two became the most prominent promoters of ISIS in the Malang area. 
B. FAKSI, Omar Bakri and ISIS
FAKSI’s aim was to get the public to realise the importance of setting up an imarah Islam and a 
caliphate. Its tools for doing so were Al-Mustaqbal, social media, and open discussion forums 
called Multaqad Da’wiy. FAKSI never tried to hide its goals. There was little danger in demo-
cratic Indonesia that anyone would try to ban discussions about the desirability of a different 
form of government and it could use them to recruit cadres for the imarah as well as prepare the 
public to welcome the caliphate when it was eventually restored. 
The organisers made a point of inviting speakers from Al-Muhajiroun headquarters. In April 
2013, for example, they held a discussion on the theme “Imarah Islam Leads to the Caliphate” 
with Omar Bakri Muhammad leading the discussion via an Internet connection. Syria was one 
of the major topics, and Omar Bakri said he was convinced that it would not be long before an 
Islamic government was established there. He was not particularly concerned about divisions 
that had recently emerged among jihadi groups and said he was optimistic that they would soon 
be smoothed over. 
In fact, almost as he was speaking, the rift between Jabhat an-Nusroh and ISIS was reaching 
a peak. The leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi, had declared the union 
of his organisation and an-Nusra, which would henceforth be known as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Sham (Greater Syria), abbreviated either as ISIL or ISIS.25 An-Nusra’s commander, however, 
rejected Al-Baghdadi’s claim, said he and his forces had never been consulted about a union 
and declared his loyalty to Ayman Al-Zawahiri as the head of Al-Qaeda. In November 2013, a 
reconciliation effort failed, and the two organisations became bitter rivals. 
Initially Fachry and his friends in FAKSI decided to be neutral (tawaquf) in the dispute. But 
on 1 October 2013, Omar Bakri declared his support for ISIS. He said that ISIS of all the jihadi 
groups was most active in working to build a caliphate in Sham and that Al-Baghdadi had all 
the qualities of a leader: he was descended from the Quraishi, the tribe of the Prophet, had deep 
25 The confusion in the abbreviation stems from whether the word in English used for Greater Syria is  “Sham” or “the Levant”. 
The terms are interchangeable; the territory covered is the same. 
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religious knowledge, was known for his piety and was a proven military commander. He aimed 
not just to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria but to fulfill the hopes of all Muslims by estab-
lishing the khilafah islamiyah ala minhajin nubuwah.26
A month later, FAKSI members and their mentor Aman Abdurrahman became more con-
vinced that ISIS was not just a jihadi organisation (tanzim) but had the qualities of a state, since 
it controlled territory such as Raqqa province in northern Syria and applied Islamic law there. It 
was also now demanding that other groups acknowledge Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi as Commander 
of the Faithful and take an oath of loyalty to him and attacked those who refused. 
The brutality shown by ISIS towards its rivals did not diminish the enthusiasm of FAKSI or 
Aman Abdurrahman, who saw the strict enforcement of takfir mu’ayyan as praiseworthy. ISIS 
was declaring most of the other opposition groups in Syria as kafir either because they refused to 
pledge loyalty to the self-declared commander, or because they were working for a democratic 
state, or because they were supported by Arab governments that were themselves idolatrous.27
C. Al-Baghdadi vs Al-Zawahiri in Indonesia
Aman Abdurrahman, M. Fachry and other FAKSI members began translating and disseminat-
ing tracts that defended ISIS and slammed its critics, including men that they had once admired 
such as Abu Qatadah, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
Al Maqdisi, for example, wrote a harsh critique of ISIS that appeared in Indonesian in Janu-
ary 2014 entitled: “Ya Allah, I Remove Myself From What They Have Done” (Ya Allah, Sesung-
guhnya Aku Berlepas Diri kepada-Mu dari Apa Yang Mereka Perbuat). He wrote:
They think they can murder their own brothers because they have connections with cer-
tain groups. This attitude cannot be endorsed. Even if these groups were hypocrites, [the 
ISIS] stance would still not be justified. Our Prophet himself had communications with 
hypocrites but treated them well and forgave them. He also forgave idolators, Jews and 
others. […] So what is the basis for shedding their blood?!”28
In a matter of days, FAKSI and websites supporting ISIS such as Aman Abdurrahman’s www.
millahibrahim.wordpress.com and Al-Mustaqbal published ISIS’s response to Al-Maqdisi, 
translated by Aman.29 At the same time, anti-ISIS tracts were translated and published on arrah-
mah.com, including Al-Zawahiri’s denial that ISIS had any connection to Al-Qaeda.30 The ISIS 
response appeared a few days later on Al-Mustaqbal.31 The debate between the two sides became 
increasingly heated, with Aman treating all ISIS critics as enemies and giving his translations 
provocative titles. For example, he headlined one translation, “Study and Analysis of the Non-
sensical and Contradictory Position of Al-Zawahiri” when the original had just been “Study and 
Analysis of the Statement by Al-Zawahiri”.32
Aman went further in his dismissal of ISIS critics than some ISIS ulama themselves, some of 
whom still respected Al-Zawahiri and bemoaned the dispute that had arisen between them.33 
26  “Syekh OBM : Daulah Islam Di Iraq Dan Syam, Berjuang Untuk Khilafah!”, Al-mustaqbal.net, 4 October 2013.
27  See millahibrahim.wordpress.com/2014/01/22/membantah-fitnah-abu-khalid-as-suri. Ths view also caused ISIS to reject 
the formation of an Islamic law council in which various factions would be represented. Its leaders argued that they could 
not place themselves in a subordinate position to a council that might contain infidels and idolators.  
28 See “Surat Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi untuk Seluruh Kelompok Jihad Suriah”, voa-islam.com, 3 February 2014.
29 Aman gave it the title “Maha Suci Engkau, Ini Adalah Kebohongan Besar, Bantahan Terhadap Pernyataan Syaikh Abu Mu-
hammad Al Maqdisiy -Semoga Allah Membebaskannya- Yang Berjudul Ya Allah Sesungguhnya Aku Berlepas Diri Dari 
Apa Yang Dilakukan Oleh Mereka Itu.” 
30 “Al-Qaeda merilis sikap resmi tentang status hubungan organisasi Al-Qaeda dengan ISIS”, Arrahmah.com, 4 February 
2014.
31 ”Al Qaeda dan Ketergelinciran Yang Berbahaya”, Al-mustaqbal.net, 13 February 2014.
32  The article was by Abu Mu’adz Al-Anshori. The title was later changed back to the original on Aman’s website.
33  See, for example, www.kiblat.net/files/2014/01/Abu-Ubaidah-ISIS1.pdf.
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These writings, which were translated and posted on other Indonesian websites, were never 
circulated by FAKSI. Instead Fachry and Aman became increasingly associated with the most 
extreme pro-ISIS positions in a way that alienated many other jihadis.
In April 2014, for example,an article appeared on Arrahmah.com with the headline “Shaikh 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri in the view of Shaikh Abu ‘Ashim Al-Maqdisi and Brother Aman Abdu-
rrahman”. It mocked Aman as someone who had only relatively recently discovered the concept 
of tauhid and jihad, hid behind a laptop and yet still dared to criticise someone like Al-Zawahiri 
who had spent half his life for the cause. The author suggested that Aman did not understand 
conditions in Syria because he had never been there and indeed had no jihad experience any-
where.34
From the beginning, Arrahmah had positioned itself as head of the anti-ISIS camp, translat-
ing and publishing many of the critiques that emerged in the Middle East. Its main objection to 
ISIS was the latter’s summary killing of other Muslims, including other mujahidin. Arrahmah 
editors believed this was a direct result of the concept of takfir mu’ayyan which led so easily to 
dissidents and critics being branded as non-believers and thus deserving of death. 
Arrahmah’s position infuriated the FAKSI group, and in Januari 2014, M. Fachry published 
a piece on Al-Mustaqbal entitled “Advice from Ustadz Rois to Arrahmah Regarding ISIS.” Rois, 
who as noted above, was on death row in Kembang Kuning Prison, Nusakambangan, had the 
gall to suggest that Arrahmah was not being fair by failing to cover both sides and only present-
ing anti-ISIS views.35
It was clear that Indonesians were following every detail of the jihadi rift in the Middle East, 
and that this was made possible in part by the translations produced by inmates of Indonesia’s 
maximum security prison. 
D. Loyalty Oaths (Bai’at) to the New Caliph
As part of its campaign to win public support, FAKSI began organising public declarations of 
support for ISIS. In Feburary 2014, it organised programs in Tangerang and Bekasi, outside 
Jakarta. At the beginning of March, it held one in Bima, Sumbawa. On 16 March, FAKSI held a 
pro-ISIS demonstration at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in the centre of Jakarta, with Bahrum 
Syah as coordinator. He explained the objectives:
We want everyone to understand that there is a far better option for the prosperity of all 
Muslims. This is not an empty offer but a genuine one that Allah is offering, a Muslim 
State. We have come to promote this state so that people will understand that the State al-
ready exists. At the same time, we want to tell the State that we, the Muslims of Indonesia, 
are with you, and that if you ask us to pledge allegiance, we are ready to do so.36
Hundreds of people came to the demonstration, most of them members of GARIS. GARIS, 
the group that joined Fachry in the early days of Sharia4Indonesia, was a radical anti-vice and 
anti-apostasy group similar to FPI (Front Pembela Islam) but it differed from the latter in that 
it had no religious scholars among its leaders. Its founder, Chep Hernawan, was a businessman, 
not a cleric, who in the past had been active in the Crescent Star political party (Partai Bulan 
Bintang). Up until 2007, GARIS had relied on a JI leader Ustadz Abdul Rahim alias Abu Husna, 
to instruct its members, but Abu Husna was arrested on terrorism charges in early 2008 and for 
a few years, no one took his place. Only recently Bahrum Syah had taken on the role, leading 
34 “Syaikh Aiman Az-Zhawahiri dalam pandangan Syaikh Abu ‘Ashim Al-Maqdisi dan Akhi Aman Abdurrahman”, Arrah-
mah.com, 8 May 2014.
35 “Nasehat Ustadz Rois Kepada Arrahmah.com Terkait ISIS”, Arrahmah,com, 27 January 2014..
36 See kdiofficial.blogspot.com/2014/03/bayan-kepada-ikhwan-para-pendukung-dan.html.
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religious discussions and propagating Aman Abdurrahman’s teachings to GARIS followers. It 
was Bahrum who persuaded Chep Hernawan and his members to support ISIS.37
Photos of the March demonstration were posted on pro-ISIS websites and Twitter accounts 
in the Arab world, which were then proudly quoted and retweeted by Al-Mustaqbal. One tweet 
said, “The Islamic State will soon come to Indonesia, insya’allah, and change the name of Indo-
nesia to ‘Islamic State of Southeast Asia’!”38
Before April 2014, these initial pro-ISIS programs did not involve formal loyalty oaths. On 
16 April 2014, however, Aman Abdurrahman made an online pledge, including the following 
passage: 
[…] This is from your brothers and devoted followers, announcing our loyalty and pledge 
to our Amir, Commander of the Faithful Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi, may Allah make him 
victorious, upon the law of Allah and the traditions of his Prophet, peace be upon him, 
in accordance with our capabilities, because we are far away from you and some of us are 
oppressed, incarcerated in the prison of the Indonesian idolators (thaghut).
And as we announce this bai’at of ours, we invite all those committed to the purity of 
the faith in Indonesia and all over the world to defend this State in any manner possible, 
whether by sending personnel, contributing wealth, spreading true news about the State, 
its religious precepts and its achievements, as well as exposing the conspiracies to under-
mine it through denials and lies. We must also take care of the families of the people who 
are going to fight for the State and teach their children so they will grow up to be mujahi-
din like their fathers.39
Other FAKSI activists quickly followed suit.
V. FAKSI ACTIVISTS IN SYRIA
A few FAKSI activists followed Aman Abdurrahman’s exhortation and left for Syria to fight. 
One of these was Bahrum Syah, who left on 26 May 2014 together with Rosikien Noer. Rosikien 
was an activist of Ring Banten, trained in Mindanao, who was also a close friend of Iwan Dhar-
mawan alias Rois. It was under Rois’s influence that he became an ISIS supporter.
Rosikien was not the first Ring Banten member to go to Syria. In early 2014, Muhammad 
Abdul Rauf, one of the men imprisoned for his role in abetting the 2002 Bali bombing, who had 
been released in 2011, left for Syria. Abdul Rauf had been a model prisoner and on his release 
had no interest in violence in Indonesia. But he reportedly wanted to help fellow Muslims and 
his first choice was to help the Rohingya in Myanmar. On a visit to Nusakambangan to see Rois, 
he mentioned his intention and Rois reportedly urged him to go to Syria, helping him connect 
with the people who knew the travel routes and contacts. He died in Ramadi, Iraq a few months 
after he arrived.40
Salim Mubarok, the FAKSI member from Malang, had also reached Syria before Bahrum 
Syah. He took his wife and child and on arrival took the name of Abu Jandal Al-Yemeni. With 
excellent Arabic, he quickly developed a wide network within ISIS and helped facilitate arrange-
ments for other Indonesians coming to join ISIS, including five of his former students in Malang. 
He asked his students who were unable to travel to form a group in support of the caliphate 
in Malang. One of these was Muhammad Romly, who announced the establishment of a new 
37 IPAC interview with former member of radical discussion group, Jakarta, August 2014.
38 “Aksi Dukungan dan Pembelaan terhadap Daulah Menjadi Perbincangan Ramai di Jejaring Sosial”, al-mustaqbal.net, 17 
March 2014.
39 Reproduced at prisonerofjoy.blogspot.com/2014_04_01_archive.html.
40 IPAC interview with former member of radical discussion group, Jakarta, August 2014.
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group, East Java Partisans of the Caliphate (Ansharul Khilafah Jawa Timur) on 20 July in which 
those present pledged allegiance to Al-Baghdadi.41
Siswanto, the former FPI member from Lamongan, East Java, had been helping facilitate 
travel to Syria since mid-2013, especially for alumni of MIT training courses in Poso. One of 
those he helped was Bagus Maskuron, a former prisoner who had been arrested, convicted and 
briefly detained for a peripheral role in the robbery of the CIMB-Niaga Bank in Medan in Au-
gust 2010.42 Bagus left for Syria in November 2013.
Siswanto himself had Poso connections. He knew Santoso from the time they had both 
fought in Poso with JI at the height of the communal confict there. They reconnected through 
Muhammad Hidayat alias Dayat, a young Medan jihadi who had trained with Santoso, then fled 
to Java to avoid arrest in 2012.43 Siswanto had helped him hide in Lamongan where he became 
an active recruiter for Santoso. One man recruited by Dayat was Zainul Arifin, a student of 
Siswanto who died in June 2013 in a failed suicide bombing of the Poso police command (no 
one else was killed). After the bombing, police tracked Dayat to East Java and killed him in an 
operation in Tulungagung in July 2013. Siswanto left Lamongan as a result and has reportedly 
been living in Bogor ever since. 
We have a detailed account of recruitment from one FAKSI activist from West Java who 
joined ISIS in Syria together with his wife. Part of the story comes from interviews with his 
friends, part from Facebook messages he sent home. IPAC had no direct contact with the activ-
ist himself.44
41 See “Lima Warga Malang Angkat Senjata Bergabung ISIS”, Tempo.co, 9 August 2014 and “Siapa Salim di Video Ajakan 
Berjihad di ISIS 2”, Tempo.co, 12 August 2014.
42 Born in Surabaya on 17 March 1984, Bagus had been active in Jemaah Tabligh before joining JAT. He was inducted into 
JAT in Surabaya in March 2010 by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir himself. In August 2010, he left for Medan, where he joined a group 
around one of Indonesia’s most wanted suspects, Mohammed Abdi alias Sabar alias Pak Bos. Arrested for his alleged role in 
a Medan bank robbery by the group in September 2010, he was released shortly thereafter. In early 2013, he joined military 
training in Poso under Santoso. Siswanto agreed to help him with contacts in Syria because of Santoso’s recommendation.
43 Dayat had first been recruited by Rizki Gunawan alias Udin, arrested for the hacking of a Malaysian foreign exchange 
website that netted him almost $700,000, a portion of which was sent to Santoso. He has sent by Rizki to Poso for military 
training in 2012. After Rizki was arrested and Dayat needed somewhere to hide, he chose Lamongan on the recommenda-
tion of a JI prisoner from Medan, Toni Togar. Toni Togar had an old classmate from Ngruki named Saefudin Zuhri, who 
had become a religious teacher. Zuhri was never told that Dayat was a fugitive. Through him, Dayat met Achsanul Huda, 
a fish trader, and the two became friends, so much so that Dayat married Achsanul’s younger sister. It was Achsanul who 
invited Dayat to take part in Siswanto’s religious discussion group, where he promoted Aman Abdurrahman’s teaching. 
Dayat then became Siswanto’s student. 
44 Long before FAKSI sent anyone to ISIS, an Indonesian had joined and died as a suicide bomber in Iraq. This was Wildan 
Mukhallad, a young man from Solokuro, Lamongan, the same village as the Bali bombers Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, 
Amrozi and Ali Imron. He was also a 2011 graduate of Pesantren Al-Islam in Lamongan, the school owned by the brothers’ 
extended family. Wildan had moved to Egypt in July 2011, at the age of sixteen, to live with an older brother who worked 
there. His greatest goal was to attend Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which he entered after getting an equivalency diploma 
from an Al-Azhar-linked high school. He had no affiliation with radical groups before he left and the only organisation 
he is known to have joined was an association of Indonesians from East Java in Egypt (Organisasi Keluarga Masyarakat 
Jawa Timur, known for short as Gama Jatim). As the conflict in Syria heated up in 2012 and Egyptians were leaving to join 
the anti-Assad mujahidin, Wildan decided to go as well. In late 2012, he disappeared. According to his Al-Azhar friends 
who have since returned to Indonesia, he told people he was going back to Java, but in fact he left for Turkey, crossed into 
Syria and joined a group Katibah Al-Muhajirin in Aleppo. The group had been formed by foreign fighters, mostly from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, and was led by a man named Abu Umar Al-Shishani. Because he was still a teenager and 
had no military experience, he was not sent into battle. Instead, he worked initially as a porter of arms and ammunition 
but took part in military training. As his dedication became apparent, he was assigned to the “police”, directing traffic in a 
rebel-controlled area, and then moved to a contested border area. In 2013, he was finally given the green light to take part 
in the fighting. Around the same time, his organisation, Katibah Muhajirun, merged with two other groups to form Jaish 
Al-Muhajirin Wal Anshar. In May 2013, the rift between ISIS and an-Nusrah exploded into the open, with smaller organ-
isations choosing between the two. It reached Jaish Al-Muhajirin Wal Anshar as well, splitting in between the two. Wildan 
chose the pro-ISIS faction. He then had to choose between the two training camps, combat forces or suicide bombers. He 
chose the second. On 10 February 2014, his family received word that he had died in Iraq, in a suicide bombing that prob-
ably took place in January 2014. 
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The activist in question is referred to here as Akang, not his real name. He was a student of 
Aman Abdurrahman’s who helped FAKSI promote support for ISIS via social media. From the 
beginning he wanted nothing more than to go to Syria to fight with ISIS and for months before 
he left, he went everywhere wearing a vest that had “Army of Caliphate” written on the back. 
Through a friend, Akang was able to get a recommendation from an ISIS official in Syria– such 
a recommendation is a prerequisite for joining. The recommender also gives the name of the 
contact person on the Turkish border who will arrange the schedule for travel across the bor-
der, arrange accommodation, and wait for the departure. At the end of February 2014, Akang 
received the contact details and word that he could leave for Syria on 26 March.
Up until this point he had concealed his plans for going to Syria and had not even told his 
wife. With the travel details in hand, he finally told her. He was sure she would not object, since 
she was also a student of Aman Abdurrahman and understood jihad in Syria as an obligation. 
What he was not prepared for was that she would also insist on going, together with their four 
children. The eldest, a girl, was a student at a pesantren for Qur’an memorisation, Pesantren 
Tahfidz Ibnu Masud, in Bogor, while the youngest was only a few months old. She reportedly 
was worried that their religious education would suffer if they were left behind with relatives. 
Akang did not know how he could possibly finance the departure of the whole family. His 
savings totaled only Rp.10 million (around $1,000). But after he sold his car, all his electronic 
goods and electrical appliances and took his final salary and social security payments, he man-
aged to amass about Rp.100 million ($10,000). Travel costs amount to between $1,000-$1,500 
per person, with the biggest expenses being the flight to Istanbul and local transport to the bor-
der as well as the cost of two days’ accommodation there. The rest, including a living stipend, 
would be handled by ISIS. The family left on 26 March, as planned. To avoid any suspicion, they 
removed all signs that would identify them as religious conservatives: Akang’s wife removed her 
niqab (veil) and Akang wore a t-shirt and pants, as though they were an ordinary family taking 
a holiday.
From Jakarta, they flew first to Doha, Qatar, then changed planes for Istanbul. From there 
they flew to Sanliurpa near the Syrian border and took a taxi to Akcakale, about 43 km away, the 
town from which most would-be ISIS mujahidin went to Syria, because it was just across from 
ISIS-controlled Raqqa province. On 28 March, as planned, the contact person came to meet 
them at their hotel and took them to a hostel known as rumah anshar (house of the partisans). 
There they met people from Belgium and Morocco, in total about 25 people. Akang and his 
family were urged to rest and told that at midnight, they would leave for Syria.
They were all woken up at midnight and went in a group toward the border. It was a narrow 
path and dark, and they were not allowed to use any lights for fear of attracting the attention of 
the Turkish army. But they were caught anyway by border guards. After being held briefly, they 
were released but told in no uncertain terms that they were forbidden to go into Syria. They all 
returned to the rumah anshar. 
On 29 March, Akang and his family were moved to an apartment where they were separated: 
Akang went with the men, his wife stayed with the women, including two from Australia, one 
from Belgium and one from Morocco. A few days later, they were all moved again, this time to 
a place closer to the border. They soon got word that they would try another crossing. They left 
again at midnight; this time they had to climb over a barbed wire fence along the border.
Their task was to get over the fence, then run 600 meters—any shorter distance and they 
could still be arrested by Turkish soldiers. Again, however, Akang’s group was caught by a Turk-
ish patrol, and all were told they would be expelled from the country. 
They did not go back to the house but waited three hours until the patrol was asleep and 
tried again. This time they succeeded in getting over the fence and into the town of Tal Abyad 
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in Raqqa. They were met by an ISIS soldier who asked for the name of their recommender. On 
providing the contacts, the soldier went away and returned with a van to pick up the group and 
take them to a house. Akang went to a safehouse for those slated for military training while his 
wife and children were placed in a house for women and children (muhajirah). Food was pro-
vided, even medical care for the children.
ISIS had two camps: the first trained cadets who were going directly into combat forces; the 
second was for candidate suicide bombers. Akang chose the first. After two weeks’ training, at 
the end of May 2014, he graduated with some 250 others, and formally became an ISIS soldier 
with a uniform, weapon, salary and housing for his family. 
After graduation, Akang and his family were moved to Haruriyah in Halab where Akang was 
assigned to an ISIS unit. As a soldier he was entitled to a salary of $50 a month, with another $50 
provided to his wife and $25 per child, so that every month, the family received $200.  Akang 
joined a unit led by Abu Muhammad Al-Amriki (“the American”), a former soldier of Al-Nusra 
who defected to ISIS. They were assisted by a sizeable ISIS force (Akang says 3,000) under the 
leadership of Abu Umar Al-Shishani, former head of another rebel group, Jaish Al-Muhajirin 
wal Anshar (JMA). Their goal was to take Aleppo.
But Akang could not spend every day with his family because he had to go to the front lines 
to defend new territory that ISIS had taken. His wife stayed home with the children, like other 
women forbidden by ISIS from activities that would take them out of the house. The most they 
could do was to help the ISIS media unit. As of August 2014, the family was still there.
VI. FAKSI AND THE CALIPHATE
On 29 June (or 1 Ramadhan 1435 in the Islamic calendar), ISIS startled the world by announc-
ing the establishment of a caliphate with Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi henceforth to be known as 
Caliph Ibrahim. ISIS changed its name to Daulah Khilafah or the Caliphate State, better known 
as the Islamic State (IS). The declaration came three weeks after ISIS’s lightning victories in Iraq, 
including the occupation of Mosul, its second largest city. 
A. The Pro-ISIS Response
ISIS supporters in Indonesia greeted the declaration of the caliphate with euphoria. On 30 June, 
Aman Abdurrahman immediately swore an oath of loyalty from his prison cell, saying, “for the 
second time, we pledge our loyalty to the Great Imam of the Islamic Caliphate Shaikh Ibrahim 
Ibn ‘Awwad Ibn Ibrahim Al Qurasyiy, blessings upon him, to hear and obey… as long as he fol-
lows the word of Allah and the traditions of the Prophet.”45
Three days later, on 5 July, several terrorist suspects held in Kelapa Dua, the headquarters of 
the paramilitary police (Brimob) south of Jakarta, took a similar oath. Their action was consid-
ered daring, because none had yet been sentenced. Generally, the detainees tend to be well-be-
haved because they know they can get heavier sentences when their trials come up if they are 
not. 
The oath-taking was led by Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah, the FAKSI member from Bima, an-
other student of Aman Abdurrahman’s. He was arrested in December 2013 in Bima, accused of 
involvement in MIB under the leadership of Abu Roban (killed by police in Central Java in May 
2013).  He had become involved in MIB through a cousin, Robithah, who had become one of 
Abu Roban’s trusted associates. He also had received a share of the proceeds from Abu Roban’s 
45 See millahibrahim.wordpress.com/2014/07/02/baiat-untuk-khilafah-islamiyyah.
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robberies and had helped arrange training for his men with MIT in early 2013. At the time, there 
had been a plan to establish a joint MIT-MIB camp in Bima, although it never materialised. 
Iskandar, however, arranged for several members of his religious discussion group in Bima to 
train with Santoso in Poso.46
Iskandar maintained his extremist views in detention and persuaded other terrorist suspects 
there to support ISIS. He also maintained communications with friends through his mobile 
phone, reportedly having regular conversations with Aman Abdurrahman, who also had a 
phone in Nusakambangan. On 20 July, he called some of his followers in Bima and urged them 
to support ISIS and the caliphate. That same day, a few dozen of them met at Mesjid Istiqomah, 
in Penato’i, Bima, and pledged their loyalty to the new caliph. The mosque was known for hosting 
extremist teachings—it was not only where Iskandar taught when he was in Bima, but also the 
meeting place for Aman Abdurrahman’s followers there.47
Meanwhile on 7 July, Fachry, inspired by a report that Omar Bakri Muhammad had sworn 
allegiance to Al-Baghdadi the day before, convened a Multaqod Da’wiy meeting at the UIN 
mosque in Ciputat, in which Fachry stated that Al-Baghdadi had met all the conditions for estab-
lishing a caliphate and that there was no reason for Muslims to hesitate any longer about declaring 
their support. Hundreds did so, and similar allegiance ceremonies were held in Malang, Solo, 
Makassar, Mukomuko (Bengkulu), Lampung, East Kalimantan and elsewhere. By the end of 
August 2014, an estimated 2,000 people had sworn oaths. Not everyone knew what what they 
were attending. Some received text messages but had little idea that the program would end 
with an induction ceremony. The vast majority of those 2,000 will neither seek to go to Syria or 
have any interest in violence. But the numbers are an indication of the appeal that the idea of a 
caliphate can generate in a devout public.
B. The Anti-ISIS Response
Despite the enthusiasm for the Islamic State in circles like FAKSI, many Indonesian jihadi groups 
were critical of the caliphate declaration.  They questioned its legality according to shari’a. Sev-
eral anti-ISIS media outlets, such as Arrahmah, Kiblat (www.kiblat.net) and others published 
criticisms, including one from Al-Maqdisi entitled “Why is the Declaration of the Caliphate Di-
viding Us?” The caliphate, he wrote, should be a protector and source of mercy and compassion 
for all Muslims, but the opposite had happened: this caliphate was spilling the blood of other 
Muslims. 
The caliphate should be the heaven Muslims are seeking, not a hell that adds to their despair. 
The caliphate is the dream of Muslims who have struggled to bring it about. Don’t let this 
beautiful dream become a nightmare with the beheadings of those who dare to differ.48
Al-Maqdisi also criticised the leadership of al-Baghdadi who was so quick to kill. This was vastly 
different from the model set by the Prophet who tried to unite, not divide.
[The Prophet’s] leadership was not designed to pepper protected people with bullets or 
behead them with swords. It was not designed to separate them but rather to protect them, 
develop them, bring them to a higher level so that as human beings they would be safe 
from slander.49
46 His own connection to Santoso was through Zipo alias Ustadz Khairi, an aide to Santoso who once taught at Pesantren 
Umar bin Khattab in Bima but fled to Poso after an incident in July 2011 when a bomb exploded at the school, apparently 
while a teacher named Firdaus was making it. The teacher’s younger brother was killed in a police operation in Bima in 
September 2014.
47 It was also the place where a previous pro-ISIS program had been held under FAKSI auspices on 2 March 2014.
48 “Syaikh Al-Maqdisi: Mengapa deklarasi khilafah justru memecah belah”, Arrahmah.com, 13 July 2014.
49 Ibid.
Abu Qatadah, the Jordanian-Palestinian cleric expelled from Britain in 2012 on charges of 
links to Al-Qaeda, and a scholar whom many Indonesian jihadis admire, was also sharply criti-
cal. He said one of ISIS’s mistakes was to make a one-sided declaration of the caliphate without 
going through a religious council representing the Muslim faithful, or at the very least, repre-
senting jihadi groups from several countries. He forbade his followers from joining the Islamic 
State, saying it was an unwarranted innovation under Islamic law (bid’ah) and that its illegality 
was multiplied by its claim to speak on behalf of all Muslims. 
The criticism increased as the Islamic State showed its brutality, and many jihadis said it was 
a travesty that beheadings and massacres were carried out in the name of Islam.50 This had no 
impact on IS’s supporters, who insisted that actions condemned as barbaric by others were in-
deed in line with the teachings of Islam as they understood them.51
VII. PRISONS AND THE SPLIT IN JAT
The division over ISIS in the jihadi community mirrored the takfir mu’ayyan versus takfir am de-
bate. The takfir mu’ayyan group led by Aman Abdurrahman supported the Islamic State, while 
the takfir am group, led by senior JI leaders such as Abu Dujana, Zarkasih and Abu Tholut, were 
opposed to ISIS and generally supported the Al-Nusra Front. The fact that all were in prison 
appeared to be no hindrance to debate or to getting positions aired on radical websites.
Many prisons had both factions. In Kembang Kuning, Nusakambangan, for example, Aman 
Abdurrahman and Rois led the pro-ISIS group while the anti-ISIS/pro-al Nusra faction was led 
by Toni Togar and Subur Sugiarto. In Jakarta’s Cipinang prison, the majority supported Abu 
Dujana and Zarkasih but one of Aman’s followers, Abu Haikal, supported ISIS.52 In Pasir Putih, 
another prison in the Nusakambangan complex, the pro-ISIS group was led by Mustaqim alias 
Abu Yusuf and Zulkifli Lubis alias Abu Irhab, while Ali Miftah and Wak Geng led their oppo-
nents. 
Initially, two of Pasir Putih’s best-known inmates, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abu Husna, took a 
wait-and-see stance, and both factions tried to win them over.  Fellow inmates in the anti-ISIS 
group were too junior to have any influence. Some of Ba’asyir’s regular visitors, including senior 
JAT leaders Fuad Al Hazimi and Muhammad Achwan, as well as his sons, Abdurrahim and 
Abdur Rasyid, tried to explain the details of conditions in Syria and urged him to stay neutral, 
given the complexity of the issues. But the leaders of the pro-ISIS group were very aggressive 
in pressing their views and had the advantage of seeing Ba’asyir every day. Moreover, Aman 
Abdurrahman would call Ba’asyir from Kembang Kuning prison for long discussions via mo-
bile phone. The stakes were high because Ba’asyir was so well known, and the pro-ISIS group 
believed that if he could be convinced to take their side, his many admirers would follow.
Eventually, the pro-ISIS group won the battle for Ba’asyir. When the caliphate was announced 
on 29 June, the old cleric joined in the group’s general rejoicing. On 2 July, he and other ISIS 
supporters swore allegiance to Al-Baghdadi in a letter that was posted on Al-mustaqbal.net, 
saying they considered themselves part of his army and ready to obey the orders of the caliphate 
50 See for example Thariq Abdul Hamid ,“ISIS Adalah Krisis-Musuh Dalam Selimut”, Arrahmah.com, 24 September 2014.
51 See “Bayan Seputar Tindakan Khilafah Terhadap Kaum Nasrani”, Al-mustaqbal.net, 26 August 2014.
52 Bakti Rasnah alias Abu Haikal served as bodyguard for Dulmatin, the Bali bomber who helped plan the Aceh training 
camp. Abu Haikal was arrested in 2010 and sentenced to six years for his role in the camp. He could be due for release in 
late 2014.
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he led.53 It was signed by Ba’asyir, Abu Husna, Abu Yusuf, Abu Ja’far and Ayah Banta.54
In the letter, Ba’asyir and his friends asked the Islamic State to secure their freedom: “In clos-
ing, Excellent Shaikh, we the prisoners of Pasir Putih who support the caliphate, hope that Allah 
will facilitate you and the army of the caliphate to help release us who have been languishing in 
the prisons of the Indonesian idolators, via war or ransom”, quoting a hadith that obliges Mus-
lims to try to free Muslim prisoners in kafir hands. 
News of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s pledge spread quickly within the JAT community. Members 
of its executive board immediately went to Kembang Kuning prison to seek clarification from 
Ba’asyir, In a meeting on 10 July 2014, Ba’asyir told the board that indeed he supported the 
caliphate but that he had not yet taken any oath. He also said JAT members should feel free 
to choose whether or not to support ISIS. Ba’asyir’s refusal to admit that he had already sworn 
allegiance to Al-Baghdadi annoyed the pro-ISIS group in prison, and they leaked the text of his 
pledge to Al-Mustaqbal which published it the next day.55
JAT then issued a statement that the news of the pledge was not true, since Ba’asyir himself 
had denied it, but senior JAT leaders began to wonder whether he was telling the truth. They 
were afraid that he was being exploited by pro-ISIS inmates; they also worried that he was not 
getting balanced information about the Syrian conflict. Accordingly, on 13 July, the religious and 
executive councils of JAT met and formally ruled that if a decision of the Amir (Ba’asyir) was in 
violation of Islamic law, then it was forbidden for members to follow it. The aim of the ruling was 
to protect members from a potentially harmful decision by Ba’asyir. 
Ba’asyir, not surprisingly, reacted angrily to the ruling, seeing it as an attempt to limit his 
authority. A similar concern had led to his decision to leave the Indonesian Mujahidin Council 
(Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) in 2008. Because of this, in a 17 July meeting with mem-
bers of JAT’s religious council that MMI leader Abu Jibril also attended, Ba’asyir acknowledged 
that he had indeed sworn an oath to Al-Baghdadi and moreover, that it was obligatory for all 
JAT members to obey that decision. Whoever refused, he said, would have to leave the group.56 
At the same time, he fired Muhammad Achwan as JAT operational commander (amir biniy-
abah) and Fuad Al Hazimi as head of the religious council on the grounds that they opposed 
Ba’asyir’s decision on the pledge. He replaced both with Afif Abdul Majid, a Ngruki teacher. 
As a result, Muhammad Achwan, Fuad Al Hazimi and Ba’aysir’s own son Abdurrahim alias 
Iim decided to form a new organisation in August 2014 that they called Jamaah Ansharusy Sya-
riah (JAS). 
VIII.  DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA 
Meanwhile, Indonesians continue to leave for Syria, where they seem to be making contact with 
fellow Southeast Asians, especially Malaysians.
The number of Indonesians in Syria remains a matter of conjecture. On 14 August, General 
Sutarman, the national police commander, said police had the names of 56 Indonesians in Syria, 
including four who had died as suicide bombers.57  On 25 August, Ansyaad Mbai, the head of 
53 “Bai’at Ikhwan Masjunin Di LP Pasir Putih Yang Mendukung Khilafah Islamiyah”, Al-mustaqbal.net, 11 July 2014.
54 Abu Yusuf ’s real name is Mustaqim. A Lampung native, he was arrested in connection with the Aceh training camp. Abu 
Ja’far is Aryanto Haluta, arrested for shooting two police in Poso in May 2011. The last is particularly interesting. Ayah 
Banta is an Acehnese and Partai Aceh supporter arrested for the politically motivated killing of Javanese workers before 
the 2012 local elections in Aceh and for plotting to kill then-governor Irwandi Yusuf, who was running for a second term 
against Partai Aceh’s candidate. Ayah Banta had no previous connection with jihadi organizations.
55  “Bai’at Ikhwan Masjunin Di LP Pasir Putih Yang Mendukung Khilafah Islamiyah”, op.cit. 
56  IPAC interview with former member of radical discussion group, Jakarta, August 2014.
57  “56 WNI ke Suriah, 4 Tewas Karena Bom Bunuh Diri, Solo Pos, 14 August 2014.
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the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme, BNPT) said 
that his agency had the names of 34 Indonesians who had joined ISIS. Those numbers, gleaned 
from families and friends, interrogation depositions of would-be terrorists arrested over the last 
year, and social media are widely believed to be low. The true figure is probably over a hundred, 
though estimates in the Australian media of over 300 are almost certainly too high.58 
Indonesians’ lack of facility in English and Arabic may be another factor keeping the numbers 
down, but language may also be drawing Indonesians and Malaysians together. From Facebook 
pages, it was clear that ISIS supporters in Indonesia and Malaysia were “friending” each other. It 
was also clear that some Indonesians were identifying themselves as Malaysians, perhaps as a se-
curity measure, just as when Indonesians and Malaysians were going to Afghanistan in the early 
1990s, many identified themselves as Filipinos. To further throw possible trackers off the scent, 
Indonesians headed for the Middle East are reportedly leaving from Malaysia, and Malaysians 
are leaving from Indonesia. There is so much travel between the two countries that it would raise 
no flags with immigration authorities on either side.
But in July 2014, the Indonesian-Malaysian connection in Syria took on a new dimension, 
with the idea of a katibah nusantara, or special unit for Malay-speaking mujahidin in ISIS. 
Before the declaration of the caliphate, there were relatively few Malaysians with ISIS; more had 
joined the Ajnad Al-Sham Islamic Union based in and around Damascus.59 One of the few to 
join ISIS was Ahmad Tarmimi, who became the first Malaysian to die as a suicide bomber in 
Iraq in late May 2014. By early August, at least 22 Indonesians and Malaysians had come together 
under the ISIS banner in the town of Al-Shadadi, Hasaka province in early August, and they began 
to discuss the desirability of forming a katibah, a military unit roughly equivalent to a company, 
about 100 men. Bahrum Syah and Rosikien Nur took part in the discussions and posted a photo 
of one meeting on the subject on Facebook.60
A Malay-speaking unit made sense militarily, because communication was a perennial prob-
lem. Most Indonesians were not fluent in either English or Arabic, and those assigned as indi-
viduals to Arabic-speaking units were often at a loss. It also made sense given the ISIS agenda 
to expand the reach of the caliphate to other areas, including Southeast Asia. Members of the 
katibah could become the vanguard for a fighting force that would reach into Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines. 
The creation of the katibah that another possible consequence of Southeast Asians fighting in 
Syria is better connections and a shared strategy after they return home.
IX. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
The Indonesian government has reacted more forcefully to the appearance of IS than to any 
other extremist movement in memory and so has the mainstream Mulsim community. The 
difficulty will be to translate genuine concern into meaningful change in terms of new legisla-
tion, improved immigration controls and better management of prisons.
58 See for example “Indonesia lauds Australia security code to keep out militants”, The Australian, 18 September 2014, which 
cites an estimate of 350 from unnamed intelligence sources. It is surprising to some that European countries could have 
more nationals fighting in Syria than the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, but Indonesians do not 
have the family ties to Syria and its neighbours that many mujahidin from immigrant communities in Europe do; Europe 
is also closer than Indonesia.
59 See “Islamic militant’s deaths sparks eulogies in Malaysia,” Reuters, 15 September 2014 and www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-
DTD7-H83s0. 
60 The Facebook page, “Bersama Ad Dauwlah Al Khilafah Al Islamiyyah #9”, 17 August 2014, has since been closed.
The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia ©2014 IPAC             19
A. New Instructions
Though forceful, the government reaction was somewhat delayed. The pro-ISIS demonstration 
in central Jakarta on 16 March did not attract much notice in the Indonesian media, nor did the 
first group of pledging ceremonies, although the 20 July event in Malang event had to be moved 
twice before finding a mosque that would allow it to go forward. It was the appearance of the 
“Joining the Ranks” video on 23 July and the coverage it received that shocked the government 
out of its complacency. Here was an Indonesian urging other Indonesians to join a political en-
tity other than the Indonesian republic. It was not that IS was more violent or more of a security 
risk than earlier movements, although both may well be true; it was that it constituted a direct 
challenge to national loyalty that so alarmed officials.
On 4 August, following a special security meeting, with police, TNI, BNPT and the intelli-
gence agencies present, Coordinating Minister for Security Djoko Suyanto announced the ideol-
ogy of IS was contrary to Pancasila, the unitary state of Indonesia and the national motto, “Unity 
in Diversity”. Accordingly, there would be an all-government effort to prevent the establishment 
of IS branches and the dissemination of its teachings. The president, said Djoko, had ordered the 
Minister of Religion to work with community leaders to explain to the public the dangers of IS; 
it was not a question of religion but one of ideology, he stressed.  
Shortly afterwards, banners began appearing all over Indonesia, on mosques, police stations, 
traffic circles and elsewhere, presumably funded by the government, saying “[name of town] 
rejects ISIS”.
It was not clear what law would be used. A few days earlier, BNPT director Ansyaad Mbai 
suggested that Indonesia could and would revoke the citizenship of Indonesians under Arti-
cle 23 of the 2006 Citizenship Law which punishes anyone who “voluntarily takes an oath or 
declares loyalty to a foreign state or part of such a state”.61 But it was not clear how this could 
actually be enforced. As one pro-ISIS supporter said defiantly in a BBC interview on 6 August, 
“What are they going to do, deport me?” He was arrested three days later, but charged with an 
earlier crime and no mention was made of the citizenship law.62
On 5 August, the Corrections Directorate issued a circular to all prisons about preventing 
ISIS influence in prisons and detention centers.63 It instructed all officials to increase supervision 
of terrorist prisoners; discipline any inmate who took an oath of loyalty to ISIS; search visitors 
and prisoners nearing the end of their sentences who are allowed to leave the prison during the 
day; carry out regular searches of cell blocks; confiscate any items with the word “ISIS” on it; and 
prevent any provocative words or actions on the part of prisoners.
Local officials issued their own regulations. On 12 August, for example, the governor of East 
Java issued Gubernatorial Regulation No. 5/2014 that ISIS henceforth was banned in East Java; 
that all districts and municipalities undertake an information and public guidance campaign 
about ISIS and report any ISIS activities to the security authorities; and that the latter coordinate 
with law enforcement to act on any reports from the public.64
As the world’s media covered ISIS atrocities in the areas under its control, President Yudhoy-
ono decided that more steps were needed. On 14 September, he  issued a seven-point instruction 
aimed at curbing the dissemination of ISIS teachings. They included the following:
61 “BNPT: Pendukung ISIS Terancam Hukuman”, Kompas, 1 August 2014.
62 The man in question was Afif Abdul Majid, a teacher at Al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki who was arrested because of his 
ISIS activities but charged for having helped fund the 2010 Aceh training camp. Police said he had been on the wanted list 
since then, but he had been preaching openly ever since and they had made no attempt to arrest him.
63 Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Corrections Directorate, “Surat Ederan No. Pas-330.PK.01.04.03 tahun 2014 tentang 
Peningkatan Kewaspadaan Terkait Aktivitas Narapidana Teroris di Lapas dan Rutan”, 5 August 2014. 
64 “Ini Peraturan Gubernur Jatim soal Larangan ISIS di Jatim,” Kompas, 12 August 2014.
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• Stepped-up efforts to prevent Indonesians citizens from going to join ISIS by being more 
“selective” in the issuance of passports and urging embassies in Jakarta to also be careful 
in their issuing of visas to the Middle East. Djoko suggested that Turkey’s policy of visas 
on arrival for Indonesians made monitoring more difficult.
• Improved monitoring of Indonesians already in Syria and their possible return. He said 
the police had information on four who had died there.
• Stricter monitoring of foreigners in Indonesia.
• Better supervision of prisons where terrorist prisoners are held, given that pledging cere-
monies that took place there.
• Stepped-up security in areas known to be home to radical networks such as Poso, Ambon, 
East Java and Central Java.
• Deployment of “soft power” in an effort to be led by the Minister of Religion and involving 
community leaders and clerics to try to guard against the influence of ISIS teachings.
• Firm punishment against those involved in terrorist activities.65
Many of these are in the spirit of the proposed UN Security Council resolution that would 
require countries to adopt legislation that requires prosecution of those who join or aid terrorist 
organizations abroad and that bans transit through their territory of people involved in such 
organizations.66 The problem will be to translate the president’s instructions into law. President 
Yudhoyono has only a month left in office; it will be up to his newly elected successor, Joko 
Widodo better known as Jokowi, and his security team to push a new bill through a fractious 
parliament with other priorities.
B. Arrests Since 1 July 2014
Indonesian counter-terror police have made numerous arrests since the ban on ISIS was an-
nounced but most of those taken into custody have been charged for other alleged crimes. Those 
arrested only for possession of ISIS materials have generally been let go with a warning.
One of the most high-profile ISIS supporters to be arrested was Afif Abdul Majid, a JAT leader 
and teacher at Ba’asyir’s Al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki. On 9 August 2014 he was apprehended 
in Bekasi, outside Jakarta, and charged with fund-raising for the 2010 Aceh camp. According to 
police, he had been active in ISIS since late 2013. He had gone to Syria, lived with ISIS for several 
months and taken an oath there to one Abu Hisham, representing Al-Baghdadi.67 In May, Ustad 
(teacher) Afif had given a lecture in Solo at the Baitul Makmur Mosque, festooned with ISIS 
flags, about his experience in Syria. The second speaker had been M. Fachry and the meeting 
appears to have been organised by Al-Mustaqbal.68
Another prominent pro-ISIS activist arrested was Muhammad Saifudin Umar, better known 
as Abu Fida. A former JI member who left to join JAT in 2008 and became a member of its 
65  “Ini Tujuh Instruksi Presiden Untuk Pencegahan Paham ISIS”, Kompas, 14 September 2014.
66  “Obama to Lead U.N. Effort to Halt Movement of Terror Recruits”, New York Times, 22 September 2014.
67 “Polri: Ketua JAT Afif Dibaiat ISIS di Suriah”, Tempo.co, 10 August 2014.
68 “Tabligh Akbar Daulah Islamiyyah Menyongsong Khilafah Sukses di Solo, Alhamdulillah!”, Al-mustaqbal.net, 12 May 
2014.
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shari’a council, Abu Fida was arrested in Surabaya on 14 August 2014.69 He had left for Syria 
on 3 August to join ISIS, in a group of eight, arranged by Salim Mubarok. He became ill with 
the flu and was quarantined by Turkish authorities before he left for Syria, however, and was 
subsequently deported, only to be arrested shortly after his return. The other seven presumably 
made it to Syria. Abu Fida was one of the main speakers at a program on 15 July 2014 at the 
Baitul Makmur mosque together with Ustad Afif, above, that concluded with a pledge of loyalty 
to the new caliphate. He was charged under the terrorism law for his role in hiding fugitives in 
a number of cases dating back to 2012.70
Others have been arrested for their connections to MIT or MIB or for possessing arms and 
ammunition.71
As of late September, however, M. Fachry continued to openly preach support for ISIS. As 
someone who has never committed a violent act, hid fugitives or possessed weapons, he is diffi-
cult to prosecute under Indonesian law.
C. Reaction in the Muslim Community
The declaration of the caliphate and the excesses of ISIS have generated a huge backlash in In-
donesia, even before the government declared it a banned organization. All of the mainstream 
Muslim organizations have condemned it. In a statement on 7 August, leaders of major Muslim 
organizations grouped together as the Brotherhood Forum of the Indonesian Council of Reli-
gious Scholars (Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Majelis Ulama Indonesia or FU-MUI), declared:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) is a radical movement in the name of Islam but 
does not put forward the compassionate and merciful aspects of Islam. On the contrary, 
it tries to impose its will using violence, murder of innocents, and destruction of places 
considered holy by Muslims and seeks to bring down states that came into being as the 
result of the struggle of the Muslim community against colonialism.  
2. Muslim mass organizations and other institutes reject the existence of the ISIS movement 
in Indonesia that has a great potential to divide the Muslim community and shake the 
Unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.
3. We urge all Muslims not be incited by the agitation and provocations of ISIS that is trying 
to impose its teachings in Indonesia and the rest of the world. We warn all Muslim organ-
69 Abu Fida was born in Surabaya on 26 January 1966. A graduate of Ummul Qura university in Mecca, he was arrested in 
2004 for sheltering Noordin Top and tortured but never tried. He became active in MMI Surabaya, then joined JAT after 
2008 and became a member of its shari’a council. Around 2008 he led an organisation called the Solidarity Forum for 
the Islamic State of Iraq (Forum Solidaritas Daulah Islamiyah Iraq, FORSODIQ) in Surabaya that was very admiring of 
Al-Zarqawi’s tactics. In December 2013, he took part in a discussion of the book, The Two-Arm Strategy. Among other 
things he says one does not have to choose between the struggle in Syria and the struggle in Poso. By supporting the jihad 
in Syria, the struggle in Poso can be widened. He cites Al-Zawahiri throughout, not Al-Baghdadi, but that was before the 
caliphate was proclaimed. See www.shoutussalam.com/2013/12/antara-jihad-poso-dan-jihad-suriah. 
70 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=Trj_xuWi83M and www.beritaumat.com/berita/sang-aktor-perekrut-mujahidin-indone-
sia-berperan-seolah-olah-gila-setelah-ditangkap-tim-densus-88.
71 On 19 July, Adham Halid alias Rafi alias Memet and Agussalaim alias Agus Abdullah bin Ibrahim/Jaho, were arrested in 
Bima and charged with links to Abu Roban and MIB. On 11 August, a man named Riyanto was arrested in Karanganyar, 
Central Java and accused of hiding a gun and bullets at the request of an MIB fugitive. See www.beritaumat.com/berita/
sederetan-peran-riyanto-alias-jono-dalam-aksi-terorisme-bersama-mib.  On 14 September, three men, Saiful, Irfan and 
Yudi, were arrested in Palu, Central Sulawesi together with four Uighurs who were apparently trying to get to Poso to 
train with Santoso. On 20 September, five men suspected of links to Poso were arrested in Bima: Juwaid alias Herman alias 
David, Suhaili alias Gondrong, Ustad Juned, Dedi Irawan and Salman. The arrests followed the capture in June of another 
Bima fugitive, Idham alias Oni. A sixth man named Nurdin was killed in the 20 September police operations in Dompu, 
Sumbawa. He was said to be the younger brother of Firdaus, a religious teacher from Bima who died in 2011 apparently 
while constructing a bomb. 
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isations, institutes,mosques and families to be vigilant and prevent the development of the 
ISIS movement in all corners of our country.
4. We support the speedy, appropriate and firm action of the government to ban the ISIS 
movement Indonesia and urge the government to enforce the law.72
Probably far more effective than this declaration has been the outpouring of anti-ISIS senti-
ments on Facebook, Twitter and other social media, from ordinary Indonesians shocked at the 
image of Islam that ISIS conveys.
It is also important to note that most of the hardline Muslim community have distanced 
themselves from ISIS or have taken a wait-and-see stance, including Majelis Mujahidin Indone-
sia (MMI), Hizb ut-Tahrir, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia and others. MMI went further 
than most in calling it a khawarij (deviant) movement. Others are convinced that the ISIS issue 
is being deliberately fanned by the intelligence community to divide the Muslim community.73
X. CONCLUSIONS: DEALING WITH HEIGHTENED RISK
The ISIS network in Indonesia is dangerous, but the strong, unequivocal government and 
community reaction in rejecting it is very good news. Now the Yudhoyono government needs 
to implement its instructions in the month it has left in office, and the incoming Jokowi govern-
ment needs to follow through.
One critical area is obviously prison management. Stopping Aman Abdurrahman from trans-
lating ISIS pronouncements will not stop their dissemination but it could slow them down and 
in any case could be a test case of ability of the Indonesian prison system to manage prisoners, 
their visitors and their communications. It is not against Aman’s human rights to deny him ac-
cess to a cell phone or reading materials in Arabic, nor to prevent visitors from bringing in any 
form of printed or electronic material.
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, international guidelines first 
published by the United Nations in 1977, state that “Prisoners shall be kept informed regularly 
of the more important items of news by the reading of newspapers, periodicals or special institu-
tional publications, by hearing wireless transmissions, by lectures or by any similar means as au-
thorised or controlled by the administration” (Rule 39) and “So far as practicable, every prisoner 
shall be allowed to satisfy the needs of his religious life by attending the services provided in the 
institution and having in his possession the books of religious observance and instruction of his 
denomination” (Rule 42). Prison officials need much more explicit training in what is and is not 
allowed and ensure that tight control is maintained over communication and reading materials.
The Jokowi government also needs to follow through on Yudhoyono’s instructions to 
strengthen the capacity of the immigration service to monitor the comings and goings of ISIS 
supporters. This means more coordination with Detachment 88 and BNPT in providing watch 
lists for officials at ferry terminals and airports as well as timely sharing of information with gov-
ernments in the region, especially Malaysia. Any bureaucratic obstacles to that sharing should 
be reviewed. 
It also needs to consult with other governments before issuing visas for radical clerics such as 
Anjem Choudary and Omar Bakri.
Indonesia does need a number of stronger laws to enforce its commitment to banning ISIS. 
For example, at present it is not illegal for Indonesians to travel overseas to take part in military 
72 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, press release, “Pernyataan Sikap FU-MUI tentang ISIS”, 7 August 2014.
73 See for example “Wawancara Harist Abu Ulya: ISIS Antara Khilafah & Jebakan Intel”, voa-islam.com, 4 August 2014.
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training, and it should be. At the same time, Indonesia needs to avoid the temptation to turn 
the current anti-terrorism law into something that more resembles an Internal Security Act like 
Singapore’s, with provisions for lengthy preventive detention without trial. In the absence of new 
laws, the government may have to fall back on prosecuting some ISIS organisers under Criminal 
Code provisions that punish criminal incitement.
President-elect Jokowi will likely defer to his security advisers on the issue of counter-terrorism 
but he needs to think very carefully about staffing key positions. If the head of BNPT changes, 
for example, it is important that it stay with the police, not the army, and that that the danger 
posed by ISIS is not seen as an opening to give a greater role to the Indonesian military. It is the 
counter-terrorism police who have the institutional knowledge, the intelligence networks and 
the track record to manage the problem, although the high rate of deaths of suspected terrorists 
in police operations over the last two years also needs to be brought down.
Finally, the incoming government also needs to rethink a strategy for counter-radicalisation, 
including through the development of a social media strategy.74 This is where BNPT and the 
Yudhoyono government have been weakest. It should not have taken a video posted on YouTube 
on 23 July to convince the government that ISIS was a threat, when incendiary teachings had 
been taking place across Indonesia for the preceding year.
74 For more on needed improvements in Indonesia’s efforts to counter violent extremism, see IPAC Report No. 11, Countering 
Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink, 30 June 2014.
The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia ©2014 IPAC             25
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle 
that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission 
is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who 
benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive 
change. 
In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful 
settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance 
to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, elec-
toral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several 
forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-es-
tablished contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written 
documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, 
with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.
We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for 
Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website 
is www.understandingconflict.org.
